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Abstract
This article explores Nigeria’s current foreign policy under the Fourth Republic (May 1999- ). It
investigates the gamut of events surrounding Nigeria’s foreign policy-making and practice since
independence (1960) and how this compares with the Obasanjo (1999-2007) administration’s
efforts at foreign policy formulation and implementation in Nigeria’s recently hard-won
recognition in the international system after 16 years of military authoritarianism. The paper
argues that the Obasanjo administration was a success given the range of domestic and
international issues that the administration was able to address. The article supports this by
focusing on the main issues in the life of the administration, including Africa’s security
management, Africa’s economic development, and the launching of NEPAD among others.
Keywords: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, Nigeria’s African Foreign Policy, Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic, Olusegun Obasanjo, Military Rule, Democracy.
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Under General Abacha, foreign policy was crudely mishandled. Records show that
Nigeria was like a country without a foreign minister and a foreign policy during that
period (Okpokpo, cited in Ilofuan, 2007, p.53).
The governments of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha, in particular,
plunged the country into a pariah status, starting with the June 12, 1993 question. They
personalised the Nigerian state… the most populous state in Africa was ostracized… It
became a country with leprosy (Ilofuan, 2007, p. 53).
…no matter how the Obasanjo-led administration’s foreign policy record is examined,
his ability to successfully launder and restore the hitherto bastardised image of the
country will forever be remembered (Ilofuan, 2007, p. 53).
The year 1960 is very important in Africa’s political history, and it is widely regarded as
annus mirabilis, a miraculous year, for more than 15 African countries gained their political
independence in that year. Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, became a sovereign
state on 1 October, 1960, and in the same year, it gained membership of the United Nations (UN)
and the Commonwealth (Aluko, 1981, p. 1; Olusanya, 1986). At independence, Nigeria’s foreign
policy actions were determined by its colonial orientations.1 During the first few years of
political independence, Nigeria’s external relations were dominated by its relationship with
Britain, its former colonial master, in particular, and the other Commonwealth countries. Things
changed in the early 1970s due to the country’s newfound wealth from oil exportation. The new
economic and financial wherewithal expanded Nigeria’s horizons abroad as the country became
primus inter pares—first among equals—in intra-African international relations and the
continent’s leading and respected voice in international affairs, especially within multilateral
institutions. From the struggles against the apartheid regime in South Africa to Angola’s
independence in 1975, through Africa’s severance of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973,
Nigeria has been at the forefront. Writing on Nigeria’s foreign policy, Professor Olajide Aluko,
using Joseph Frankel’s phraseology, contends that Nigeria became “a regional power in black
Africa.” This is because, Aluko (1981, p. 1) continued:
[Nigeria’s] opinions are sought by many of the great powers on matters that are of
concern to Africa. While it is true that [Nigeria] is heavily dependent on the great powers,
especially the Western countries, for. . .trade, investments, and technology, [Nigeria] has
been able to use [its]large internal market opportunities and foreign investments,
especially in the oil industry, to influence [the] conduct [of others] on African issues.
It is disheartening that Nigeria’s influential status in African affairs of the 1970s faltered with the
overthrow of the civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) by the Major
General Muhammadu Buhari-led junta in December 1983 and the authoritarian nature of
governance of the Buhari regime.2 Military authoritarianism reached its zenith with General Sani
Abacha’s dictatorial rule (1993-1998). During Nigeria’s military rule (1983-1999),
authoritarianism replaced the rule of law; the constitution ceased to be the law of the land, and
the country saw a dramatic increase in incidences of gross human rights violations. The political
situation in Nigeria appeared critical with Abacha, who, following the footsteps of his immediate
military predecessor, General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993), embarked on a well-orchestrated
yet ultimately fake “transition program” for his self-succession (Badmus, 2005a). As a result of
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these volatile political-military situations, Nigeria became isolated from the comity of civilized
states and acquired the unenviable status of a pariah state. The conduct of Nigeria’s foreign
policy at that time was crudely mishandled, as Okpokpo and Ilofuan rightly argue in the first two
epigraphs of this paper. The death of Abacha in office on 8 June 1998 paved the way for General
Abdulsalami Abubakar to become the new military ruler, who, although a military man,
understood that authoritarian leadership was not in the best interest of the country. The new
regime quickly recognized the problems that beset the country, which Abubakar Abdulsalami
took concrete steps to address, by, among other things, implementing an actual transition
program that eventually led to the country’s Fourth Republic, in May 1999.
The rebirth of democracy in Nigeria was highly welcome both by Nigerian citizens and
friends of Nigeria, as it provided an opportunity for the country to repair its image and put
Nigeria on a new path of socio-economic development and global recognition and acceptance.
The expectations of Nigerians on democracy and its positive impacts on Nigeria’s foreign
relations were based on the fact that liberal ideals are, in the post-Cold War international system,
the principal yardsticks by which to measure whether a government is responsible and
accountable. That is, democracy and respect for human rights have become core values;
achievement of both serve as a means by which to assess whether or not a government is
responsible since it is believed that democratic leadership and the protection of citizens are
catalysts for achieving socio-economic development. Therefore, it is important for any country
wishing to maintain cordial relations with the external world in the post-Cold War international
environment to accept the dictates of this global reality.
For nearly two decades, Nigeria has once again been governed by civilian authority.
Thus, a period of 18 years offers a credible time-frame for a meaningful assessment of Nigeria’s
international relations under civilian rule. This paper explores the imperatives of democracy and
good governance in the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy, especially in African affairs. The
paper seeks to explore how democratic rule has helped the country in salvaging its image and
promoting its foreign policy objectives, especially as it relates to Africa. The paper analyzes
these issues vis-à-vis Nigeria’s foreign policy achievements in African affairs during the
Olusegun Obasanjo-led administration. Toward this end, the article focuses on some main issues
in the life of the Obasanjo administration such as the launching of New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD); Africa’s security management; promotion of democracy and good
governance in Africa; restoring Nigeria’s battered image and regaining the country’s status as a
leader in intra-Africa international relations, among others.
Explaining Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
Foreign policy is conducted because no country is an island to itself. As Holsti (1995, p. 250)
stated, foreign policy’s “purposes and actions…are designed to sustain or alter a current object,
condition, or practice in the external environment [and guide] the search for security, welfare,
autonomy, and prestige.” The nature and direction of foreign policy undertaken by any nation
normally “arises primarily from domestic needs.” Therefore, there is a symbolic relationship
between foreign and domestic policies of a state since the two operate along a continuum. The
close linkages between domestic and foreign policies of a state are important, and, as Jaemahn
(1989, p. 16) contends, neither one can be worked out entirely apart from the other. The domain
of the latter encompasses the international environment. The domestic policies of state are
important to the events at the global level, and a well and clearly formulated foreign policy can
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be a not only a catalyst for development but also a vehicle for addressing socio-economic
challenges confronting a state, especially for developing countries like Nigeria. However, poor
formulation and implementation of foreign policy can have dire consequences for a country at
the domestic level.
Within the context of Nigeria’s 57 years of political independence, it is possible to
outline the objectives, principles, and basic underpinnings of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The
principal objective of Nigeria’s foreign policy has been to promote and protect the country’s
national interests in its inter-state relations. The indexes of these national interests, as enunciated
by successive governments since independence are (i) the defense of the country’s sovereignty,
independence, and territorial integrity, (ii) the restoration of human dignity to black men and
women all over the world, particularly the eradication of colonialism and white minority rule in
Africa, (iii) the creation of the relevant and viable political and economic conditions in Africa
and the rest of the world, (iv) the promotion and improvement of the economic well-being of the
Nigerian citizens, and (v) the promotion of world peace and justice (Obiozor, 1994, pp. 159-165;
Ogwu, 1986, p. 9; Olusanya & Akindele, 1986, pp. 2-3). Some of these objectives are not
realistic and are also mere window-dressing especially for a less developed country like
Nigeria.The cost involved in achieving some of these objectives make them simply impracticable
and they should be confined to the domain of wishful thinking (see Vogt, 1990, p. 94).Olajide
Aluko (1979, cited in Ogwu, 1986, p. 10) stated that “…most of [Nigeria’s objectives] are not
realizable and therefore, cannot provide a rational and realistic basis for the country’s external
behavior.” Similarly, the eradication of colonialism and apartheid have become irrelevant since
Africans have assumed the mantle of leadership in the Southern African sub-region, especially in
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and the Lusophone states of Angola and Mozambique. As
such, the objective regarding the “eradication of colonialism” ought to be revised within the
formal foreign policy objectives of Nigeria to reflect the contemporary objective of eradicating
the institutionalized remnants of colonial rule (Badmus, 2005b, pp. 87-92; Vogt, 1990).
As for Nigeria’s foreign policy principles, the first is the principle of non-alignment in
the international system. Today, this appears to be an embattled principle. Non-alignment rejects
formal military alliance with, and habitual political support for, either of the East-West Cold War
power blocs. What we establish at the very outset is that although Nigeria professes nonalignment in the articulation of its foreign policy, its colonial history and stance on many
international issues, especially during the First Republic (1960-1966), point to the contrary. Prior
to the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), Nigeria followed the lines of Britain, its former colonial
master.3 During the Nigerian civil war, however, Britain rejected Nigeria’s request for military
assistance and the purchase of arms and ammunitions in its war efforts against the Biafra
secessionists. Nigeria’s bitter experiences with the West (especially Britain) compelled the
Nigerian government to look towards the countries of the East, especially the defunct USSR for
military support. In the current international system, the principle of non-alignment has become
an anachronism. It is little wonder that the G7 has shifted its focus to economic and development
problems that have become major impediments to socio-economic emancipation of Third World
regions.
The second principle is the legal equality of all states. While states are equal in theory, a
critical look at Nigeria’s African foreign policy reveals an ambivalent position regarding such
equality. If it can be argued that Nigeria’s participation in the campaign for the independence of
Angola and Zimbabwe was provided in terms of diplomatic and financial support for the
liberation movements in these colonial territories before their independence, the same cannot be
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said about its interventions in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars in the 1990s as we shall
see in details later. This question of the equality of states pertains directly to the third principle,
which is that of non-interference in international affairs. Fourth, Nigeria is committed to
multilateralism, as it sought international cooperation as a participant in peacekeeping
operations. Nigeria’s presence is felt in the area of preventive diplomacy in the postindependence years. Multilateralism underscores Nigeria’s membership within international
organizations. Last is the principle that sees Africa as the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy.
Nigeria’s African foreign policy was evident in the forming of the Organization of African Unity
(the OAU, now the African Union or the AU), and it remains so under the new pan-African
institution, the AU as well as in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Sesay and Owoeye (1993, p. 201) asserted that Nigeria’s African policy has remained the same
over years despite regime changes. The centrality of Africa in Nigeria’s foreign policy is
important to the extent that this commitment to Afro-centric policy was enshrined in Section 19
of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Shortly Before May 1999: Authoritarianism versus Global
Ostracism
As we mentioned earlier, Nigeria was, for many years, under military rule (between
1966-1979, and 1983-1999), and this has had considerable impact on the conduct of its foreign
policy and external relations.4 Military rule negatively impacted Nigeria’s with respect to its
credibility and battered its image at the global level. Under military authoritarianism, decisionmaking in Nigeria’s foreign policy was unidirectional, as it was often conducted by executive
fiat, with the head of state situated at the center of foreign policy formulation and
implementation alongside his foreign affairs minister. In a military regime, the head of state is
the embodiment of decision making, and the command structures of the military do not
accommodate dissenting voices within its hierarchy. What the head of state says is final and
becomes the law. The absence of a counterweight like the National Assembly (or Parliament) in
civilian rule, combined with the psychological traits and idiosyncrasies of the military dictators
leaves little room for multilateralism. Indeed, during Nigeria’s period of authoritarian rule, its
“foreign policy” “smack[ed] of obscenity, obstinacy, and obstreperousness” (Omotola & Saliu,
2003, p. 2). The decision-making in the formulation and implementation of Nigeria’s foreign
policy was the prerogative of the military head of state, and most “policy” simply reflected his
personal worldview. The normal channels were bypassed or ignored; thus, foreign policy
formulation and implementation become personalized by the head of state. Fawole (2004) puts it
succinctly:
Perhaps one of the bad and unenviable legacies of military rule in the area of external
relations [was the] personali[z]ation of policy-making by the maximum rulers. This was
due to the absence of effective mechanisms for policy making, the arrogation of
excessive powers to the military ruler, the deliberate subversion or marginali[z]ation of
existing foreign policy-making institutions and structures such as the foreign service, the
federal executive council, the research institutes and policy think tanks. The consequence
was that foreign policy making was still ad hoc and far less routini[z]ed [even] after forty
years of independence. (p. 5)
At the domestic level, the authoritarian nature of military rule in Nigeria had dire
consequences on the political-economic base of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The Nigerian economy
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was mismanaged, and contracted rather than expanded. The economy was also plagued by
rampant and endemic corruption in both private and public sectors. Nigeria’s military regimes
embarked on wholesale looting of the public treasury, which worsened the socio-economic
situations of the country with accompanied low standards of living of many Nigerians. It has
been alleged that more than $12.2 billion in oil revenue disappeared during the Babangida
regime, while under the succeeding Abacha regime, between $1 and $3 billion was personally
stolen (Badmus, 2009a; Human Rights Watch, 2007). In addition, the implementation of the
World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) by the Babangida’s administration
worsened the socio-economic conditions of the majority of the population, as many Nigerians
were living in absolute poverty. The underdeveloped nature of the Nigerian economy, the
hardships brought about by the implementation of SAP, together with the inequitable state
policies in the distributions of national wealth caused a flare up in ethno-religious conflicts in
different parts of the country (especially in such major cities as Lagos and Ibadan in Southwest
Nigeria, and Enugun and Calabar in the Eastern part of the country),as the masses (the
unemployed youth in particular) became willing tools in the hands of the political elites, who
opposed military rule. At this point, the domestic base of Nigeria’s foreign policy was weak and
fragile, and political-security was at risk, particularly with the annulment by the Babangida
regime of presidential elections of 12 June 1993 (popularly known in Nigeria simply as “June
12”), an action that was condemned worldwide. Public outrage and condemnation of the
annulled elections forced Babangida out of power in August 1993. Because Babangida was in
haste to hand over power, he appointed an Interim National Government (ING) that was
comprised of unelected civilians under the leadership of Chief Ernest Shonekan, a Yoruba
technocrat from Southwest Nigeria. With the ING in place, Babangida stepped aside. As
expected, the ING was overwhelmed by deteriorating socio-economic situations, and an
increasing spate of political-military unrest. The ING was inundated with domestic problems,
and the interim administration lacked the necessary leverage to articulate a vibrant and goaloriented foreign policy for the country (Badmus, 2009b).
The interim government’s piece-meal initiatives were invidious in a heated polity. During
this period, Nigeria was at the verge of disintegration as a result of the volatile political-military
situations of the country. The Abacha-led junta seized power in November 1993, (only 82 days
after the ING was inaugurated). Abacha was the most senior officer in the Nigerian army at that
time and also defense minister in the interim administration. The new military leader, General
Sani Abacha, constituted his decision-making organ, the Provisional Ruling Council (PCR). As
events unfolded, the Abacha regime became authoritarian, committing human rights abuses on
an unprecedented scale. Extra-judicial killings and murders became rather commonplace
(Fawole, 2003). The 1994 death of four prominent Ogoni men (known as the “Ogoni four”)5 at a
political meeting in the country’s Niger Delta region—a crime that was subsequently pinned on
nonviolent activist Ken Saro-Wiwa,6 who was executed by the Abacha regime—was a case in
point. The killings of Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues led to widespread condemnations of the
regime and resulted in Nigeria’s suspension from the Commonwealth of Nations for over three
years. Expectedly, the international community imposed economic sanctions on Nigeria that
further worsened the socio-economic conditions of average Nigerians and shifted the domestic
base of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The military-political situation of the country was so fragile that
Nigerians witnessed bomb explosions and assassinations of political figures that opposed
military rule. These assassinations were later traced to the junta, although the military
government pointed accusing fingers to the opposition, especially the National Democratic
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Coalition (NADECO). The assassination of Pa Alfred Rewane, a NADECO chieftain, the murder
of Alhaja Kudirat Abiola, wife of Moshood Abiola (a wealthy business mogul and the presumed
winner of the annulled June 12 presidential elections) were further evidence of state-sponsored
terrorism in the country. Instead of adopting a conciliatory approach to mend relationships or any
options involving “subtle diplomacy” through persuasion (Omotola & Saliu, 2003: 3), or what
Osita Agbu (1999, pp. 148-149) refers to as “a pragmatic liberal diplomatic approach,” or even
adopting and implementing policy options that would make Nigeria’s foreign policy acceptable
within the norms of international community, the Abacha government, as is characteristic of
tyrannical rule, became confrontational, arrogant, defiant, and, above all, turned a deaf ear to all
entreaties. The hawkish approach of the regime at that point in time is also reflective of the
idiosyncrasies of the then decision makers in Nigeria’s foreign policy. Thus, Nigeria’s foreign
policy in the time following the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election was far less
stable than what exists now. It was low in quality and ostensibly ad hoc in character with no
predictable direction. By and large, the period characterized the nadir of Nigeria in international
institutions. Nigeria not only became the target of criticism by its traditional western allies,
owing to its poor human rights records, it also became an economic outcast from the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and creditors clubs, with the attendant result being a
derelict state of the domestic economy. One Nigerian newspaper, The Guardian, captured the
Nigeria situation under Abacha aptly:
[T]he post-June 12 [1993] period bears that hallmark of a near-chaotic approach to
foreign dealings. Nigeria’s ‘enemies’ have multiplied, embarrassingly, on the
international plane. Our powerful voice has been muffled, [which] further alienate[s] us
from the comity of worthy friends. (Cited in Saliu, 2000, p. 49)
These were Nigeria’s domestic and external realities when Abacha died in office in June
1998 and General Abdulsalami Abubakar assumed leadership of the country. Faced with
domestic and international pressures, the Abubakar administration embarked on a fence-mending
mission with the most important countries of the world and reconciled with opposition groups in
Nigeria. He subsequently cancelled the Abacha transition program and came up with his own
sincere program for returning the country to civil rule. As part of Abubakar’s transition program,
new political parties were registered, elections were held, and in May 1999, the military finally
left the political arena for the new civilian administration of the Nigerian Fourth Republic.
The New Context of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
Professor F. S. Northedge (1968, p. 15) asserts that the foreign policy of a country is “a product
of environmental factors—both internal and external to it.” Therefore, the environment of policy
formulation is pertinent in order to have assertive foreign policy that will be able to achieve the
country’s national interests. In foreign policy studies, both the domestic and external
environments play a role. There is a relationship between the two environments, as events at the
domestic level often determine and shape foreign policy, while the events at the external, global
level affect and/or determine events at the domestic environment of the country. In this section,
we examine these environments of foreign policy formulation and implementation and explore
how the new democracy has brought positive changes in the foreign policy formulation and
conduct of Nigeria’s external relations.
As noted earlier, Nigeria was confronted with harsh domestic and external environments
in the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy under military rule. This is due to both

Journal of International and Global Studies Volume 9, Number 1

63

internal and international opposition to the authoritarian rule of the government of the day. With
the advent of civil rule, the domestic environment of policy formulation witnessed a complete
transformation, as due process is now followed, while such institutions as the presidency,
National Assembly (which is made up of the House of Representatives and the Senate), federal
ministries, federal executive council, foreign service, and research institutes such as the Nigerian
Institute of International Affairs, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Parastatals,
among others have their roles in the conduct of foreign policy as articulated in the constitution.
The president runs the country on a daily basis, and foreign policy is his domain. In his capacity
as the president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, he is the principal actor in both
domestic and foreign policies formulation. The president sets the foreign policy agenda in line
with his visions and party’s manifesto; this is in accordance with the dynamics of international
politics. However, the president is not the only actor in foreign policy making and
implementation, for he is assisted by a number of ministries and parastatals (Fawole, 2004, pp.
12-13).
Unlike the situation during military rule, under civilian administration, the power of the
president are not absolute. It is subject to constitutional checks of the National Assembly. For
example, the president is empowered to appoint ambassadors and high commissioners, but he
must seek the approval of the National Assembly (Section 171 of the 1999 Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria). The National Assembly also exercises control over the ratification
and renunciation of international agreements and treaties negotiated and signed by the president,
his ministers, or envoys on behalf of the Nigerian state (Sections 11 and 12). Such
agreements/treaties can only enter into force after they have been ratified and passed into law as
an Act of the National Assembly, among others. Another area in which the National Assembly
exercises control is finance. The executive arm of government must request and receive the
National Assembly’s approval before any money can be made available for spending, even in
matters relating to foreign and defense policies. Sections 59 and 80-82 of the constitution state
that before any money can be withdrawn from the Consolidation Revenue Fund of the Federation
for any purpose, it must be approved by the Nigerian National Assembly. The National
Assembly’s power and control over finance and government spending can easily abet or hold
back the chief executive’s ability and capability to conduct foreign policy. Informed public
opinion (such as civil society organizations, mass media, and organized labor) is now, to a large
extent, in support of the civilian administration, unlike the situation under the preceding military
regimes. The favorable domestic environment of policy formulation is boosted by the personality
and psychological factor. This idiosyncratic variable7 should not be overlooked, for it has an
overbearing influence on the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign relations. The personality and
psychology of a leader (the chief executive officer in particular) determines the policies
formulated. Therefore, the policies of the government are reflective of the leader’s worldview
and his personal traits; how he sees and defines the situation are function of his psychology. As
an erstwhile Nigeria’s External Affairs Minister, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi poignantly puts it:
“The constitutional provisions form the skeleton: they are the bare bones. It is the personality of
people running the system that puts the flesh on the skeleton, giving us the recogni[z]able form”
(Akinyemi, n.d.). Under the civilian administration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the president
was (and he is still, after leaving office) a man of international clout and respect who brought
some degree of respect to the Nigerian state and presidency in particular. As a former military
ruler of Nigeria (1976-1979), Obasanjo voluntarily handed over power to a civilian
administration in 1979, and since then, he has been at the forefront of the struggles to
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democratize Africa’s political environment. In this respect, Omotola and Saliu (2003) argue that
Obasanjo came in as president with impressive, if not intimidating credentials. This, according to
Omotola and Saliu, directly contrasts the inexperience of Abacha. Obasanjo’s impressive
credentials were supported by the personality of his foreign affairs ministers. Of particular
importance is that of Foreign Affairs Minister Alhaji Sule Lamido, who displayed a high level of
maturity, skills, dexterity, and good mastery of the job (Omotola & Saliu, 2003). Thus, the
democratization of the hitherto militarized and constricted political space has brought
unquantifiable improvement to the domestic base of Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation and
implementation.
At the global level, the transfer of power in Nigeria from military rule to civilian
authority in May 1999 ended the pariah status of the country, and Nigeria was welcomed back
into the comity of civilized nations, as it conducted its external relations according to the
accepted norms of international society. This singular event witnessed the relaxation of strained
international relations between Nigeria and the outside world, especially western countries, and
subsequently, the major powers/industrialized nations lifted political-economic and military
sanctions that had been imposed on Nigeria. The international skepticism of Nigeria became a
thing of the past.
Re-Engineering Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: May 1999-May 2007
When we speak of re-engineering Nigeria’s foreign policy, we have in mind the repairing
of the damage and international disrepute that the military regimes and authoritarianism caused
Nigeria in the comity of nations. It is not an exaggeration to say that while the diplomacy of the
Abubakar regime was mainly focused on reconciliation both at home and abroad, especially with
the industrialized countries in the West, which espouse democratic ideas and ideals, the
succeeding Obasanjo’s shuttle diplomacy was even more vigorous. This was due to the
newfound democratic fervor. Nigeria’s foreign policy under Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was a
continuation of that initiated under Abubakar, for Obasanjo’s civilian administration continued
the reconciliation agenda/program of Abubakar’s military (but not totalitarian) regime. Although
President Obasanjo gained a reputation for traveling extensively (and was indeed called the
“traveling president,”)8 in fact, modern diplomacy requires a leader that gives an international
window of opportunities to allow his country to have new political and economic views and
opportunities by reaching out to world leaders. The groundwork for these opportunities can be
laid through shuttle and political, as well as summit diplomacy. Because of its past experiences
with military rule, Nigeria under a democratic dispensation (especially under Chief Obasanjo)
was in dire need of repositioning itself, through its foreign policy implementation, to become a
respected state in the world. We now turn to our discussion on the Obasanjo presidency
specifically, and Nigeria’s foreign policy under Obasanjo with reference to Africa. But before we
examine this, it is pertinent, first, to look at the methods adopted by the civilian administration at
the domestic level—i.e., the administration’s economic policy and diplomacy—in order to have
a vibrant and articulate foreign policy.
A major policy that the Obasanjo government implemented to revamp the national
economy, boost productivity, and increase social amenities as well as roll back poverty was the
implementation of economic reform agenda via the National Economic Empowerment and
Development Strategy (NEEDS). Explaining the importance of NEEDS to the Nigerian public,
Obasanjo stated that “the on-going reform agenda that has been packaged as the NEEDS is our
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grand strategy to reposition Nigeria for stability, growth, development and prosperity for all.”9
President Obasanjo’s belief in this reform agenda can be heard in his words:
Once the reform agenda at the federal level is effectively complemented by initiatives at
the state and local levels in the State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
(SEEDS) and Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (LEEDS)
respectively, we can begin to see unbounded and unprecedented development in all
sectors and improvement in our lives.10
The fact that the Nigerian government’s economic diplomacy was aimed at revamping and
revitalizing the domestic economy shows that there is a nexus between national and international
economies and also an intrinsic link between the two in Nigeria’s foreign policy. The thrust of
the administration’s domestic economy policy was economic liberalization. The policy was
geared towards opening the Nigerian market by attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
through a key feature of the economic policy: privatization. Privatization means the partial or
total withdrawal of government equity from some sectors of the economy that were hitherto
under the firm control of the government. The establishment of the Bureau of Private Enterprise
(BPE), one of the most important (perhaps, the principal) instrument for the realization of this
policy agenda was commendable, as it showed the administration’s determination to revamp the
ailing and contracted Nigerian economy. However, the Obasanjo regime’s withdrawal of
subsidies from the downstream sector triggered socio-economic unrest. The attendant result of
Obasanjo’s deregulation and market-oriented policies initially engendered a spiral of inflation,
with negative consequences on the purchasing power of Nigerians—in spite of the stated
objectives of NEEDS. Even within the ruling party (the People’s Democratic Party or PDP), the
government’s economic policy was subjected to an avalanche of criticism contrary to the
government’s self-praised and acclaimed economic success. For example, the former Attorney
General and Minister of Justice in the Second Republic (1979-1983), and a PDP chieftain, Chief
Richard Akinjide lamented the low standards of living of the average Nigerian. The eminent
lawyer asserted that “Up till now, not less than 70% of Nigerians are living below poverty level.
Yet we have never in the history of Nigeria produced as much wealth as we produce now. Our
foreign reserve is now above $30 billion” (The Punch Newspaper, Lagos, 11 September 2005).
Akinjide’s position is corroborated by Ploch (2007, p. 9) who said:
Nigeria has the second largest economy in Africa and generates over $47
billion a year in oil and gas revenue, and yet many of its people are among
the continent’s poorest. According to USAID, 70% of Nigerians live on less
than $1 per day, and the average life expectancy is only 47 years…The
country ranks 159 of 177 countries on [the] UN Development Programme’s
(UNDP) Human Development Index. The US State Department attributes
Nigeria’s lack of social and economic development to decades of
unaccountable rule.
Despite these criticisms and some difficulties encountered by the Obasanjo administration, we
assert that the market-oriented policies did yield and that since Obasanjo left office in May 2007,
the policies have been yielding handsome dividends that have not yet been reflected in the socioeconomic well-being of the majority of Nigerians. The main reason for this is due to corruption,
looting of the country’s treasury, and the ongoing mismanagement of the economy by other
political leaders. For example, the former Minister of Petroleum Resources under President
Goodluck Jonathan, Deziani Alison-Madueke, is presently being investigated by the government,
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and more than $100 billion has been recovered from her; this is in addition to her properties that
have been seized by the present Buhari administration.
There is no arguing that government alone cannot reduce the level of unemployment.
Privatization will unequivocally translate into the absorption of a significant number of the
unemployed population, especially youths. Yet at the same time, the government should not
overlook the fact that economic liberalization is a double-edged sword and can have negative
effects on foreign policy options. For example, excessive liberalization and dependency on
foreign capital for economic development will undoubtedly make Nigeria over-dependent on the
West, thus weakening the domestic foundation necessary for a radical approach to foreign
policy, as was the case of the nationalization of the British assets (British Petroleum or BP and
Barclays Bank) in Nigeria during the Obasanjo military regime of the 1970s. It is important to
realize that with the economic situation in Nigeria, a radical posture in foreign policy against the
West would have been counterproductive and to a large extent suicidal at a time when Nigeria
was pleading for economic support.
Another aspect of the Obasanjo economic diplomacy is the issue of debt pardoning for
Africa and Nigeria in particular. In many international fora, Obasanjo emphasized the linkages
between and among developing nations’ debts and the toll of debts on the African economy.
Nigeria’s economic diplomacy bore fruit in 2006 with the cancellation of 60% debt Nigeria owed
the Paris Club when Nigeria’s Finance Minister, Okonjo-Iweala, helped by the US Treasury
Department, persuaded the Paris Club to forgive $18 billion of Nigeria’s foreign debt
(Herskovits, 2007)
The Obasanjo Presidency and Nigeria’s African Foreign Policy: Balance Sheet and
Critiques
In this section, we examine the balance sheet of Nigeria’s foreign policy and external
relations under Obasanjo. Nigerian diplomacy under Chief Obasanjo can be viewed from two
perspectives: the first is the domestic policy, which serves as a springboard for international
policy. In fact, the correlation between domestic and foreign policies allows us to have a better
understanding of Nigeria’s foreign policy in this era of democracy with concomitant positive
effects that bear on Nigeria’s diplomacy. The performance of the Obasanjo administration in
Nigeria’s international relations can be analyzed at three levels: the West African sub-region, the
continental (Africa) level, and the global arena. The administration employed shuttle diplomacy
to conduct its foreign policy and promote Nigeria’s image at the external environment. This way,
the administration pursued Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives, and the president’s face-to-face
diplomacy with other world leaders helped Obasanjo become known as a globe trotter president
in Nigeria, for in the annals of Nigeria’s foreign policy implementation and external relations, no
president has ever traveled abroad like President Obasanjo. The scope of this paper focuses on
the African (West Africa inclusive) dimension of these achievements in Nigeria’s external
relations, particularly as it relates to regional security management, socio-economic
development, among other issues.
The West African sub-region: Regional security management and economic development
At the inception of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic in 1999, the West African political-military
environments were volatile, with pockets of armed conflict and political violence in neighboring
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countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Côte d’Ivoire to mention but
a few. This situation, together with the adverse socio-economic conditions of the sub-region,
provided the new civilian Obasanjo administration in Nigeria the opportunities to launch itself,
prove to the world that Nigeria was still relevant in the scheme of things in West Africa, and also
to showcase Nigeria’s African foreign policy. Some of the achievements of Nigeria’s West
African policy are examined in this section.
Nigeria’s post-military foreign policy focus in Sierra Leone under Obasanjowas
characterized by continuity.11 And, by continuity we mean the continuing and reinforcing of the
peace initiatives undertaken by the Abubakar regime (Badmus & Ogunmola, 2003; Ogunmola &
Badmus, 2006). The resolution-seeking nature of Nigeria’s external relations with President
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone was noticeable under General Abubakar. Abubakar’s
military administration even attempted to withdraw Nigeria’s troops from Sierra Leone because
the constitution of Nigeria specified that intervention in foreign conflict was to be limited to
peacekeeping operations.12 Indeed, Nigeria’s ongoing military intervention in Sierra Leone’s
conflict, launched by General Abacha—when he sent the Nigerian troops to reverse a coup in
Freetown, Sierra Leone—was not only costly in financial terms but also led to the death of many
Nigerian soldiers (Berman & Sams, 2000: 124). It was apparent to subsequent Nigerian policy
makers that the ideal way out of the political-military problem in Sierra-Leone was a peaceful
resolution of the civil war. Without doubt, the Nigeria-led ECOWAS13 peace operation in Sierra
Leone, to which Nigeria had contributed a majority of troops and funds, was the force that
guaranteed the survival of the civilian government in Sierra Leone. The Obasanjo administration
continued and consolidated policy laid down in Sierra Leone by the Abubakar regime by
prioritizing a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The ECOWAS’s military intervention and its
diplomatic efforts, coupled with that of the international community were remarkable and
successful when, on 7 July 1999, the ECOWAS leaders, officials of the UN, and others met with
the warring parties in Togo and signed the much publicized Lomé Peace Accord, which formed
the basis of peace in Sierra Leone. (The implementation of the accord was not unproblematic due
to lack of sincerity of the rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to respect the
signed agreement. With the deployment of a UN peace operation—the UN Mission in Sierra
Leone (UNAMSIL)—the stage was set for Nigeria to completely pull its troops out of Sierra
Leone.) However, Nigeria’s withdrawal was only symbolic, as Nigerian contingent in the
ECOMOG soldiers were re-hatted and became the advanced elements of UNAMSIL. The Chief
of Defense Staff of Sierra Leone was Nigerian Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe, and a
respected Nigerian diplomat, Chief Olu Adeniji, was appointed both the Special Representative
of the UN Secretary General in Sierra Leone and UNAMSIL Head of Mission. In fact, Abuja
reiterated its position through Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff, General Victor Malu, saying, “We
don’t want to leave when the UN is not ready and by so doing give the rebels a chance to
threaten the capital” (Victor Malu, cited in The Guardian, 17 February 2000). The presence of
UNAMSIL did not stop Nigeria making its presence felt in Sierra Leone until peace returned,
and it also gave a positive sign to Nigeria’s friends and the international community that the
country was fully back into the comity of nations, as subsequent events in Côte d’Ivoire and
Liberia proved.
On 19 September 2002, Côte d’Ivoire descended into civil conflict. The conflict added to
the volatility of the West African security environment of the 1990s. Côte d’Ivoire, once a haven
of political stability and beacon of economic growth and prosperity in West Africa, was engulfed
in conflict as a result of the mismanagement of the political legacies of the first Ivorian president,
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Félix Houphouët-Boigny, amid economic contraction where a new social construct, that is the
doctrine of Ivoirité, took center stage of socio-political unrest that led, inexorably, to the Ivorian
civil war.14 Nigeria, basking in the glow of its rediscovered political strength, actively involved
itself in the diplomatic efforts within Côte d’Ivoire that resulted in the signing of various
ceasefire and peace agreements by the belligerents. Nigeria was a member of the ECOWAS’s
Contact Group on Côte d’Ivoire that was set up to mediate peace.
Nigeria’s foreign policy in intra-African international relations during the Obasanjo
administration reached its zenith when the Nigerian president became the African Union (AU)
Chairman. Obasanjo used his new position and status to influence the course of negotiations in
the Ivorian conflict in order to achieve lasting peace in that country. Nigeria was present at the
signing of all the agreements, whether under the auspices of ECOWAS, the AU, or the UN.
Nigeria was at the forefront of the quest to find lasting peace in Côte d’Ivoire even after the end
of Obasanjo’s chairmanship of the AU, since Nigeria was a member of the AU-mandated
International Working Group (IWG) to facilitate negotiations and implementation of the various
agreements by the parties to the conflict. Several meetings were organized purposely to move the
peace process forward. Nigeria was also a key player in the establishment of the ECOWAS
Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI), which created buffer zones between the rebels that
controlled north of the country and the government forces that occupied the southern part of Côte
d’Ivoire (Badmus, 2015a; Ogunmola, 2013).
In the Ivorian crisis, Nigeria adopted a new diplomatic and political strategy that actually
paid off. This innovation was a radical departure from peace enforcement that Nigeria undertook
in the first Liberian civil war (1989-1996)—which saw President Samuel Doe out of power
during ECOMOG I operation in Liberia—and its military intervention in Sierra Leone,
especially when General Sani Abacha was Nigeria’s leader. These two operations were
condemned at home by the informed public opinion, which did not see any objective rationale in
Nigeria’s interventions.
The second civil war in Liberia (1999-2003) pitted the government of Charles Taylor
against two rebel movements, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
in the north, with the support of Guinea, and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)
in the south (Reno, 2007, p.77). From the outset of the war, President Obasanjo adopted a
peaceful approach to the resolution of the conflict through the Nigerian government working in
concert with ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN, instead of undertaking a dangerous peace
enforcement operation. The zenith of this international cooperation with other leaders paid off
when,on11 August 2003, Charles Taylor relinquished power and departed Liberia for and lived
in exile in Nigeria. Taylor’s exit as Liberia’s president was “not because LURD had overthrown
him. Instead, he accepted a bargain with an International Contact Group that included US,
British, and French officials that if he left Monrovia, he would not be prosecuted before a war
crimes tribunal in Sierra Leone” (Reno, 2007, p. 79).
With Charles Taylor out of power, prospects for peace and reconciliation in the WestAfrican sub-region (particularly in Liberia) were enhanced with the deployment of the Nigerialed ECOWAS peace mission (the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia or ECOMIL) with the assistance
of the US and the UN in August 2003 (Cook, 2005, p.1). Nigeria shouldered numerous
responsibilities in conceptualizing and operationalizing ECOMIL. ECOMIL was commanded by
a Nigerian General, Festus Okonkwo (Ross, 2005, p.61). The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
later replaced ECOMIL. The belligerents and 18 political parties signed the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) in August 2003, which led to the establishment of a National
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Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) (Cook 2005, p.2).The concerted efforts of the
international community paved the way not only for the presidential elections in 2005, won by
Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, but also for a post-war reconstruction in Liberia (Badmus, 2015b).
Following the death of Togo’s President Gnassingbé Eyadema in February 2005, a
constitutional crisis ensued over the appointment of his son, Faure Eyadema, as acting president
by the Togolese military. Doubtless, the actions of and move by the military were flagrant
violations of Togo’s 1992 Constitution, which vested the power of acting president upon the
speaker of the national assembly. The decision to appoint Eyadema’s son was condemned by
ECOWAS, the AU, the UN, and the broader international community. The AU and ECOWAS,
under the chairmanships of President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Mamadou
Tandja of Niger and other international organizations were resolute on maintaining the legality
and legitimacy of protocol in filling the vacant post of the Togolese president. Their mediation
efforts were successful, for Faure Eyadema stepped down on 26 February 2005, and sanctions
that had been imposed on Togo were lifted (Ebeku, 2005, p. 6). Moreover, an interim speaker of
the national assembly was elected to serve as the acting president of Togo. These efforts paved
the way for the conduct of a new presidential election. Nigeria was very influential owing to its
incumbency of the AU chairmanship. The Togolese main protagonists met with President
Obasanjo in Abuja as well asin Lomé on many occasions during the search for workable political
solutions. Eventually, Faure Eyadema, the flagbearer of the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais
(RPT), defeated the presidential candidate of the Union des Forces du Changement (UFC),
Emmanuel Akitani Bob, to emerge as a democratically elected president during the 24 April
2005 election—though the election was marred with irregularities, and the opposition parties
declared the election a sham. On19 May 2005, Nigeria hosted a meeting of theAU leaders in
Abuja. One of the main purposes of this meeting was to consolidate the fragile peace and
promote reconciliation in Togo (African Union, 2005, p. 4). In a nutshell, the conduct of the
presidential election in Togo was a victory of legality over illegality and an achievement for
Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Obasanjo.
Despite its commitment to peaceful resolutions of sub-regional conflicts, the Nigerian
government under Chief Obasanjo took time to address the socio-economic problems that beset
West Africa. One of main founders of ECOWAS in 1975, Nigeria has historically played a
leadership role in the activities of the organization since its inception. Abuja provides a
conducive environment for the institution to function since it hosts its Secretariat(now known as
the ECOWAS Commission) in Abuja. Nigeria finances most of the institution’s activities, and it
also pays about half of the institution’s annual budget (Fawole, 2004). Thus, in pursuance of its
commitment to the goals of economic integration and development, Fawole (2004, p. 45) writes,
“The Obasanjo government established a separate Ministry of Cooperation and National
Integration in Africa with a cabinet rank minister in charge. This is with a view to pursuing
inherited commitments to the development of West Africa and economic integration in Africa
through the African Economic Community, whose treaty was signed in Abuja in 1991.”
The rest of Africa: Leadership role conceptions, security management and socio-economic
development
It is important to state that Nigeria’s post-military foreign policy performs creditably in African
affairs, especially in the areas of conflict resolution and management, and economic
development. During the Obasanjo administration, Nigeria was at the forefront at all meetings,
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conferences, and negotiations that resulted in the transformation of the OAU into the AU, as well
as the launching of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). In the area of
peaceful resolution of conflict, Obasanjo’s Nigeria was also at the forefront, with particular
examples being its efforts in strengthening the political impasse in São Tomé e Príncipe and the
Sudan’s Darfur conflict, among others. The assessment of these achievements constitutes our
main task in this sub-section.
The global transformation and many problems confronting Africa at the end of the Cold
War necessitated the transformation of the OAU into a new, improved and proactive pan-African
institution and became, in 2002, the African Union, (AU). Nigeria showed strong commitment to
the realization of the establishment of the institution, particularly during its transition phase.
Thus, Nigeria was one of the principal forces behind the establishment of the AU. The AU was
officially launched at the meeting of African heads of state and government held in Durban,
South Africa on 9 July 2002. The transformation of the OAU into AU enjoyed Nigeria’s support
and the commitment of President Obasanjo.
Nigeria’s commitment to African affairs was also evident during the launching of
NEPAD, which was the initiative of Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdoulaye Wade
of Senegal, Abdulazeez Bouteflika of Algeria, and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. The Nigerian
president provided the impetus and the much-needed leadership that served as a boost to the
Africa’s initiative of having a new, home-grown, rather than externally imposed, economic
blueprint for African development. The NEPAD document’s aims at supporting Africa’s
development through Africa’s own efforts, in partnership with the advanced countries of the
world (see Kempe, 2002for details). The NEPAD initiative received financial support from the
advanced countries, especially the G8.Obasanjo’s Nigeria also supported the African initiative
financially. Obasanjo, during his leadership of Nigeria, was a member of NEPAD Steering
Committee, and a Nigerian diplomat, Ambassador Aluko Olokun became the Head of NEPAD
Implementation Committee. This is a clear indication of Nigeria’s assertive foreign policy
achievement in African Affairs.
When Major Fernando Pereira-led coup d’état in São Tomé e Príncipe on 16 July 2003, it
presented yet another opportunity for Nigeria to exert its influence in conflict resolution in
Africa. What reinforced the Nigerian government’s position to be more involved in resolving the
political crisis is that President Fradique de Menzes of São Tomé e Príncipe was in Nigeria
attending the 6th Reverend Leon Sullivan Summit at the time of the coup, while his foreign
affairs minister, “Nando” Rita, was attending an international meeting of the Community
Lusophone Countries (CPLP) in Portugal. As expected, the reactions of the international
community were negative and hostile towards the junta. Nigeria responded to the coup by
supporting the AU resolution to ostracize the junta. The Nigerian government’s position is
understandable, particularly given the fact that President de Menzes was the guest of Obasanjo at
the time of the coup. The Nigerian president, working together with other African leaders within
the context of the AU, did not foreclose the possibility of using military force to reinstate de
Menzes (Porto, 2003, pp. 34-35). However, São Tomé e Príncipe ultimately returned to
constitutional order in response to intense pressure from the international community. President
Obasanjo accompanied the reinstated President de Menzes to his country. Obasanjo’s position
was also premised on Nigeria’s national interest. This is because, as Porto (2003) stated:
It relates to the process of bidding for São Tomé’s nine deep-sea oil blocs in
the Joint Development Zone (JDZ), where Nigeria has 60% revenue sharing

Journal of International and Global Studies Volume 9, Number 1

71

interest. The amount that will accrue to Nigeria from the ongoing bidding is
estimated by sources close to Obasanjo at $162 million. (p. 35)
The conflict in the Sudan’s Darfur region15posed challenges to the Nigeria’s African foreign
policy. The start of the war can be traced to the February 2003 rebellion championed by the
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
demanding greater political representation in Khartoum and an end to decades of
marginalization; the rebellion provoked a military response from the Khartoum-based
government and Janjaweed.16The atrocities committed against civilians by the protagonists and
the North/South war between Khartoum and the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A) worsened the security situation in Darfur, inducing complex emergencies. The
developments saw the AU peacemaking efforts go into top gear; this was with the strong backing
of Nigeria. President Obasanjo, the AU chairman, became a major force in finding peaceful
solutions to the conflict. With the support of Nigeria, Idris Derby’s Chad negotiated a peace
agreement between Khartoum and the SPM/A on 3 September, 2003.This served as the basis for
the Inter-Sudanese Internal Dialogue (ISID), hosted by Chad. The ISID led the belligerents to
sign the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on Darfur Conflict (HCA) on 8 April 2004 and at
the same time to adopt a Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance for Darfur.
All these efforts received the support of the Nigerian government. Furthermore, Obasanjo, in his
capacity as the AU chairman, was in Sudan (and in Darfur in particular) on many occasions to
dialogue with the belligerents. Abuja hosted the much-publicized Abuja Peace Talks. In the area
of peacekeeping, Nigeria was the main troops contributing country (TCC) to the AU-mandated
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). AMIS was mandated to monitor and observe
compliance with the HCA and other future agreements, abetting the confidence building process
and providing a secure and enabling environment for the deliverance of humanitarian assistance
and the return of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees to their home (Badmus,
2015).
In spite of Abuja and the international community’s efforts to bring peace to Darfur, the
protagonists’ indifference to the peacekeeping efforts further worsened the security situation of
the region. In addition to the fact that Nigeria was the leading troops contributor to AMIS and
also the leading TCC to the succeeding AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which,
was deployed in 2007, Nigeria has also provided substantial financial and humanitarian
assistance as part of its commitment in bringing peace to Africa (Badmus, 2015). Although the
war is still ongoing, the efforts of the Obasanjo’s led administration will forever be remembered.
This is a clear case of Nigeria’s commitment to Africa as the center-piece of its foreign policy.
International interventions in Darfur have reduced the scale of killings and relatively improved
the security of the region.
It is undeniable that the Obasanjo administration achieved considerable gains in his
conducting of Nigeria’s foreign policy during the late twentieth century and early twenty-first
century (just as he did during his time as a military ruler of Nigeria in the 1970s). This position is
corroborated by Ilofuan’s earlier statement in the third epigraph of this paper. However,
Obasanjo had his limitations, especially with respect to his approaches to foreign policy
implementation. His shortcomings in foreign policy implementation have brought an avalanche
of acerbic criticism against the administration. President Obasanjo is, to some extent, reputed for
conducting Nigeria’s external relations without following due processes. Sometimes, a number
of institutions and structures that are constitutionally empowered to have inputs either directly or
indirectly in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy were bypassed and, at best,
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ignored. Some Foreign Affairs Ministers under Obasanjo only existed in name and played
subordinate roles, for the president was his own Foreign Affairs Minister, for example. The
National Assembly complained on a number of occasions, accusing Obasanjo of acting on
foreign policy issues without proper consultations with the Nigerian law makers. Therefore, it is
not a surprise that some Nigerians saw/see the president’s conduct as being anti-democratic.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the formulation and conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy under
the Fourth Republic and how it has departed from what it used to be under military rule. The
paper has established that Nigeria’s foreign policy under the civilian administration of Chief
Obasanjo was successful going by a number of domestic and international issues it was able to
resolve, especially in Africa, namely, Africa’s security management through peacemaking and
peacekeeping operations, Africa’s economic development through the transformation of the
OAU into the AU, and the launching of NEPAD among others.
In spite of these policy achievements, the paper has also established that for this solid and
articulate foreign policy of the civilian administration to be sustainable, it must, of necessity, be
rooted in strong domestic structures. In this regard, the economic diplomacy of the government,
especially its privatization and liberalization policies, and war against corruption and graft,
among other agendas, must be pursued with more vigor. Although the succeeding Umar
Yar’Adua (2007-2010) and Goodluck Jonathan’s (2010-2015) governments embarked on their
own economic agendas (the so-called Seven Points Agenda, and the Transformation Agenda,
respectively) meant to continue the revitalization and sustainability of the Nigerian economy, it
must be realized that it is only when a country has a solid economic base, together with favorable
socio-cultural and stable civil-military relations within the context of democratic rule that its
foreign policy can be assertive in order to achieve its interests at the global level. From all
indications, this is the foreign policy thrust of the new civilian administration of President
Muhammadu Buhari (May 2015- ).
At this time, Nigeria needs to re-examine its national interests and foreign policy
objectives. Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives must be realistic, for some of the current interests
that are being pursued by the government such as the restoration of human dignity to black men
and women all over the world, are at best, anachronistic and unrealizable, and should be regarded
as wishful thinking. This is a grandiose goal that lacks grounding in Nigeria’s economic reality.
All said, Obasanjo’s foreign policy record was a success story; the onus is now on President
Muhammadu Buhari to continue the good work of President Obasanjo.

Notes
1

Literature on the impacts of colonial legacies on Nigeria’s foreign policy is extensive. See
Akinyemi, 1989.
2
Nigeria was under the military governments of General Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975) and
Generals Murtala Muhammed/Olusegun Obasanjo (1975-1979). These regimes, despite the fact
that they were military in nature, to some extent, ruled Nigeria in accordance with the norms of
international behavior.
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In the colonial world, African states were aligned with either of the Cold War divide, and one
could easily distinguish the sphere of foreign or economic policy (Leslie & Weinstein, 1977, pp.
283-286).
4
For a comprehensive analysis of Nigeria’s foreign policy under military rule, see Fawole 2003.
5
The murder of four regional chiefs in Ogoniland, home to Nigeria’s ethnic minority Ogoni
people, occurred during the height of tensions surrounding government efforts to impose a
military presence in the areaand resume crude oil extraction. The region’s chiefs and leading
activists had been criticizing the government for failing to protect the region from environmental
devastation at the hands of the petroleum industry.
6
Ken Saro-Wiwa, Nigerian writer, television producer, and environmental activist, was also
president of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), a nonviolent movement
protesting the environmental degradation of the Ogoni region’s land and waters. The arrest,
persecution,and subsequent execution of Saro-Wiwa(and eight other Ogoni leaders) by the
Abacha regime provoked international outrage.
7
On the influence of the idiosyncratic variable, see Roseneau, 1966.
8
Akindele, 2003, reported that between May 1999 and Mid-August 2002, Obasanjo made 113
oversea trips, spending 340 days outside Nigeria.
9
Retrieved from http://www.nigeriaworld.com/../100404.htm (accessed, 17 November 2015).
10
Ibid.
11
On Sierra Leone’s civil war and international interventions, see Badmus and Ogunmola, 2009,
Ogunmola and Badmus, 2006, Ogunmola 2013.
12
The potential pullout of Nigeria’s troops from Sierra Leone, as was contemplated by the
Abubakar’s regime, alarmed the international community, for it was thought that such a
withdrawal would pose a threat to sub-regional security, prompting the international community
to commit more funds and logistics to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (Berman &
Sams, 2000, p. 126).
13
Founded in 1975, The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a union
of 15 West African states that was originally established to promote economic integration and
“collective self-sufficiency” in the region; eventually, the objective of ECOWAS broadened in
scope to include regional peacekeeping and the fostering of a collective regional security.
14
The authors have done extensive work on the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. See Badmus, 2009c,
Badmus 2015a, Ogunmola, 2007.Ogunmola, 2013, and Ogunmola and Badmus, 2005.
15
For background studies on Darfur conflict, see Badmus, 2008, 2011; De Waal (ed.), 2007.
16
The Janjaweed are the Arab militias fighting in Darfur alongside the Khartoum-based regime.
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